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Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy Against the Dragnet Use of Facial
Recognition Technology
MARIKO HIROSE
Our society is steadily marching towards a world in which cameras
equipped with facial recognition technology could be used to conduct
constant and dragnet surveillance on people as they walk down the street.
The law, as is usual in the field of privacy and emerging technologies, is
lagging behind—no clear set of constitutional rules constrains law
enforcement’s use of this powerful technology, especially because the
prevailing axiom has been that there is no right to privacy in public
spaces. This Article challenges the axiom and argues that the dragnet, realtime uses of facial recognition technology violates reasonable expectations of
privacy.
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Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy Against the Dragnet Use of Facial
Recognition Technology
MARIKO HIROSE*
[I]t is quite possible to find solitude in public. More importantly, it is also
true that it is not necessary to be encased in a steel and glass container in
order to do so. . . . [O]ne of the things strangers produce in their
interactions with one another is privacy.1

I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2016, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced a
“transformational plan to reimagine New York’s bridges and tunnels for
[the] 21st century.”2 Among over one-hundred pages of PowerPoint slides
describing new flood protection, energy-efficient lighting, automatic
tolling, and public art, were two that have the potential to transform, or
even eviscerate, privacy as we know it.3 These slides described the
installation of “state-of-the-art facial recognition software and equipment”
at every “crossing” into New York City and at airports and transit hubs like
Penn Station, “ultimately becoming one system-wide plan.”4 It would open
the door to the use of dragnet, real-time facial recognition—a world in
which the government could, without any individualized suspicion, scan
the faces of people in public and retrieve their identifying information.
Facial recognition has long triggered anxieties about a dystopian
*
At the time of writing, the author was a Senior Staff Attorney at the New York Civil Liberties
Union Foundation and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law and New
York University School of Law. I am grateful to Aadhithi Padmanabhan, Rashida Richardson, and Ben
Wizner for their insight and feedback and to Professor Marcus Aldredge of Iona College for taking the
time to guide me through existing sociology research. All views expressed here are my own.
1
LYN H. LOFLAND, THE PUBLIC REALM: EXPLORING THE CITY’S QUINTESSENTIAL SOCIAL
TERRITORY 88 (1998).
2
Press Release, MTA, Governor Cuomo Announces Transformational Plan to Reimagine New
York’s Bridges and Tunnels for 21st Century (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.mta.info/news-governorcuomo-bridges-and-tunnels-led-lights-open-road-tolling-automatic-tolling/2016/10/05 [perma.cc/f8HTBAHB].
3
N.Y. STATE, BUILDING TODAY FOR A BETTER TOMORROW: REIMAGINING NEW YORK’S
CROSSINGS 25, 32, 54, 65 (2016), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/
MTACrossingsPresentation_2016.pdf.
4
Id. at 44–45.
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world. In the 2002 film Minority Report, Tom Cruise plays a hero in a
world where there is no place to hide because facial recognition (and iris
scanning technologies) allows the government to identify every person as
they go about their daily lives. In such a world, there is no room for free
speech, free thought, dissent, or human rights.
Despite the deep unease at the world of prevalent facial recognition,
we continue to inch closer to that reality without an adequate discussion of
the consequences. Aside from Governor Cuomo’s proposal, a 2016 report
from the Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technology identified five
major American police departments at varying stages of interest in buying
and using facial recognition technology that could be paired with real-time
video surveillance.5 The documentary film “Do Not Resist,” also released
in 2016, featured yet another type of real-time facial recognition already in
use: in one scene, a Los Angeles police officer explains that she uses an
automatic license plate scanner to identify wanted cars as she drives down
the street and that she can now also use a scanner equipped with facial
recognition technology in a similar manner.
This is only the beginning. We already live in a world with thousands
of closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) trained on our public movements and
automatic license plate readers scanning the locations of our cars. New
York City alone has a network of over 6,000 government and private
cameras that are connected to one system—the Domain Awareness
System—that also culls information from multiple government databases,
automatic license plate readers, and gunshot spotters.6 The rollout of police
body cameras in localities across the country will bring tens of thousands
more mobile cameras to the streets.7 The future in which those cameras are
equipped with facial recognition technology might not be in such a distant
future.8
The law has not yet begun to grapple with the prospect of such a
5
GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED
POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 27 (2016) [hereinafter CPT REPORT],
www.perpetuallineup.org.
6
John J. Miller, Deputy Comm’r of Intelligence & Counterterrorism, Testimony Before the New
York City Council Committees on Public Safety and Fire and Criminal Justice Services, New York
City Police Department 4 (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/pr/
terrorism_preparedness_testimony_11122014.pdf [perma.cc/55PP-HXBP]; NYC, DEVELOPING THE
NYPD’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 4–6,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/home/POA/pdf/
Technology.pdf [perma.cc/3RB3-GBR4].
7
See, e.g., Justice Department Announces $20 Million in Funding to Support Body-Worn Camera
Pilot Program, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 1, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentannounces-20-million-funding-support-body-worn-camera-pilot-program
[perma.cc/D9K6-35HK]
(announcing $20 million in funding to support body-worn camera pilot program in local and tribal law
enforcement organizations).
8
See, e.g., Ava Kofman, Real-Time Face Recognition Threatens to Turn Cops’ Body Cameras
into Surveillance Machines, INTERCEPT (Mar. 22, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/22/real-timeface-recognition-threatens-to-turn-cops-body-cameras-into-surveillance-machines/ [perma.cc/8AJWNJ5P].

2017]

PUBLIC FACES, PRIVATE IDENTITIES

1595

future. Today, there is no comprehensive federal statute that governs the
use of facial recognition technology in any of its forms, whether by private
or public actors.9 No court has yet decided the constitutional rules
governing law-enforcement uses of facial recognition technology; indeed,
higher courts are still in the process of deciding if and how the Fourth
Amendment applies to surveillance technologies that have now been in use
for decades, like cell phone location tracking, prolonged video
surveillance, and license plate readers.10 Moreover, this slowly emerging
case law does not, at first glance, offer an obvious constitutional
framework to apply to the use of facial recognition technology in public
spaces, where the prevailing axiom has been that there is no right to
privacy.11
This Article challenges the notion that there is no right to privacy in
public and advances an argument for why dragnet, real-time use of facial
recognition technology violates reasonable expectations of privacy
protected under the Fourth Amendment. By dragnet, real-time uses, I mean
the possibility of suspicionless and surreptitious law enforcement uses of
cameras equipped with the technology (whether stationary or mobile) that
can be used to scan people’s faces as they go about their daily lives and to
accurately match the faces with corresponding identifying information in
an existing government database. The identifying information could be, for
example, name and address combined with other information such as age,
place of employment, immigration status, criminal record, arrest history,
outstanding warrants and tickets, or perceived involvement in a gang.
This Article proceeds by describing the landscape of current lawenforcement uses of facial recognition technology and then by arguing that
9
Certain existing laws, like the Privacy Act, may impose certain limitations on how the
government can collect information in federal government databases that serve as reference databases
for facial recognition technology. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552A(a)(4) (2012); see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: FBI SHOULD BETTER ENSURE
PRIVACY
AND
ACCURACY
2
(2016)
[hereinafter
GAO
FBI
REPORT],
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677098.pdf [perma.cc/3YQU-PHP7].
10
Although the Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones that the attachment of a GPS device
implicates the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not reach the separate and “thorny” question of
whether long-term location monitoring separately triggers Fourth Amendment concerns. United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). In 2016, petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court were filed
on cases that raise the constitutionality of warrantless cell phone location tracking, United States v.
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. filed, No. 16-6308 (Sept. 26, 2016); United
States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. filed, No. 16-402 (Sept. 26, 2016), and the
constitutionality of warrantless prolonged video surveillance, United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282,
285 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2016 WL 4083077 (Dec. 5, 2016). Also in 2016, the New York
Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York State, granted leave to hear a case challenging the
suspicionless access to license plate databases. New York v. Bushey, 47 N.E.3d 96 (N.Y. 2016). As this
Article is going to print, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carpenter v. United States.
11
See Susan McCoy, Comment, O’Big Brother Where Art Thou?: The Constitutional Use of
Facial-Recognition Technology, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.J. 471, 485 (2002) (“Facialrecognition is based on visual surveillance, which has long been held not to fall within the scope of the
constitution . . . . [t]herefore, facial-recognition technology does not violate privacy rights”).
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reasonable expectations of privacy protect against its dragnet, real-time
uses, drawing from prior legal scholarship, sociology research, and the past
half-century of case law at the intersection of privacy and emerging
technologies.12 As the initial section makes clear, the prevalent and
accurate use of facial recognition technology of the type that is the focus of
this Article is still, thankfully, hypothetical due to technical limitations.
The intent of the Article is to advance the discussion of how the existing
Fourth Amendment framework protects against a future use of facial
recognition before it is too late to step away from the brave new world of
dragnet facial recognition.
II. THE CURRENT REALITY: INCHING TOWARDS THE DRAGNET, REAL-TIME
USES OF FACIAL RECOGNITION
Facial recognition technology is one of many biometric technologies,
or technologies that “identify individuals by measuring and analyzing their
physiological or behavioral characteristics.”13 Facial recognition
technology comprises a camera that captures an image of an unknown
person and an algorithm that compares the “faceprint” (or “facial
template”) of the person in the image to those in a database of known
people (“reference database”).14
A. Expanding Law Enforcement Uses of Facial Recognition Technology
Certain law-enforcement uses of facial recognition technology are
already prevalent at both federal and local levels.15 The FBI now routinely
uses facial recognition searches to identify individuals in the course of
12
This Article builds on works of other scholars, including: Laura K. Donohue, Technological
Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97
MINN. L. REV. 407, 415 (2012); Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth
for Fourth Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH 430, 462–63 (2011); Wayne A.
Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1610–11 (2012); McCoy, supra note 11, at 492–93;
Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to
Anonymity, 72 MISS. L. REV. 213, 312–15 (2002).
13
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: COMMERCIAL
USES, PRIVACY ISSUES, AND APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW 3 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/680/671764.pdf [perma.cc/U9GG-J7NS]. Other biometrics that can be used for identification
include fingerprints, handprints, irises, voice, and gait. Id.
14
Id.; GAO FBI Report, supra note 9, at 5–6.
15
For example, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles uses facial recognition
technology to identify individuals who attempt to obtain more than one identification document under
different names. See N.Y. State, Governor Cuomo Announces 13,000 Identity Fraud Cases Investigated
by DMV Using Facial Recognition Technology, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-13000-identity-fraud-casesinvestigated-dmv-using-facial-recognition [perma.cc/8N88-7HKC]. The Center on Privacy &
Technology report discusses a number of other ways in which facial recognition technology might be
used. See CPT REPORT, supra note 5, at 10–12 (describing how law enforcement uses facial
recognition technology to identify individuals who have been stopped or arrested, or are being
investigated, as well as to identify individuals using real-time video surveillance).
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criminal investigations: between August 2011 and December 2015, the
FBI, as part of its own investigation or at the request of a state and local
law enforcement agency, ran over 200,000 face recognition searches.16
According to an estimate in the Center on Privacy & Technology report,
more than one in four of all American state and local law enforcement
agencies can “run face recognition searches of their own databases, run
those searches on another agency’s face recognition system, or have the
option to access such a system.”17
Most of these current, known law-enforcement uses of facial
recognition technology do not involve the dragnet deployments of facial
recognition technology that is the focus of this Article.18 This is likely due
to technical limitations. Even uses of facial recognition technology in
controlled environments raise significant concerns about accuracy,
especially for women, children, and African-Americans, for whom the
existing facial recognition algorithms are known to be less accurate.19
Dragnet, real-time facial recognition, in which the image of the individual
is not taken in a controlled environment, is still more inaccurate and
ineffective because of “computational limitations, video quality, and poor
camera angles.”20
Nevertheless, in addition to New York State, at least five local law
enforcement agencies—the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”), the
West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center, the Chicago Police Department,
South Sound 911 in Washington, and Dallas Area Rapid Transit—already
“either claim to use real-time video surveillance [with facial recognition
software], have bought the necessary hardware and software, or have
expressed written interest in buying it.”21 Of these departments, the LAPD
has already installed at least sixteen surveillance cameras that are capable
of recognizing faces at distances of up to six-hundred feet and identifying
individuals who are on its hot lists of “wanted criminals or ‘documented’
gang members.”22
Both the demand and the supply for more and better real-time facial
recognition technology for law-enforcement use appear to be strong. Many
private companies already sell real-time face recognition systems,
16

Id. at 25.
Id.
18
See id. at 26–27 (discussing the risk levels associated with different forms of facial recognition
technology usage in police agencies across the states). Such uses may also raise significant privacy and
other concerns, especially depending on what reference database is used, but an analysis of these uses
is beyond the limited scope of this Article.
19
See id. at 53 (“The most prominent study, co-authored by an FBI expert, found that several
leading algorithms performed worse on African Americans, women, and young adults than on
Caucasians, men, and older people, respectively.”).
20
Id. at 29.
21
Id. at 27.
22
Id. at 23.
17
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including NEC, Cognitec, 3M Cogent, Safran Identity & Security,
Dynamic Imaging, and DataWorksPlus.23 Vigilant Solutions, a company
that sells subscriptions to its private database of automatic license plate
reader data, also sells mobile facial recognition software for lawenforcement use.24 Taser International, a company building police body
cameras, plans to begin live-streaming body camera footage and using
facial recognition.25
Although commercial uses of real-time facial recognition are outside
the scope of this Article, private-sector supply and demand will likely push
to improve this technology. One company already proposed a real-time
facial recognition application that would have allowed the wearer of
GoogleGlass to glance at a passerby and learn the person’s name,
occupation, and public Facebook profile information.26 Although the
deployment of that application was delayed following public outcry, other
companies have moved forward with marketing real-time facial
recognition software, including software that claims to allow churches to
track parishioners or shops to identify suspected shoplifters.27 Facebook’s
facial recognition algorithm has been reported to be 98% accurate, more
accurate than the FBI’s technology.28 It seems inevitable that market
forces, both private and public, will drive improvements in real-time facial
recognition and its pervasiveness.
B. Ready Availability of Government-Operated Reference Databases
While it may take some years for real-time facial recognition
technology to improve to the point of accuracy, once society reaches that
reality law enforcement will already have access to a number of
government-operated reference databases that can be used as a source of
identification information. Today, the faces of over 117 million American
adults are enrolled in a facial recognition reference database, and this

23

Id. at 28–29.
VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, https://vigilantsolutions.com/products/facesearch_facial_recognition
[perma.cc/39BM-5WXY] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
25
Matt Stroud, Taser Plans to Livestream Police Body Camera Footage to the Cloud by 2017,
MOTHERBOARD (July 18, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_ca/read/taser-axon-police-bodycamera-livestream [perma.cc/V7BH-6UEA].
26
Natasha Singer, Never Forgetting a Face, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/technology/never-forgetting-a-face.html
[perma.cc/VTM2YZUB].
27
Robinson Meyer, Who Owns Your Face?, ATLANTIC (July 2, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/how-good-facial-recognition-technologygovernment-regulation/397289/ [perma.cc/NW3B-G2EG].
28
Naomi Lachance, Facebook’s Facial Recognition Software Is Different from the FBI’s. Here’s
Why, NPR (May 18, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2016/05/18/477819617/facebooks-facial-recognition-software-is-different-from-the-fbis-heres-why
[perma.cc/N4H8-D6RN].
24
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number is growing every day.
One expansive reference database is the FBI’s Next Generation
Identification-Interstate Photo System (NGI-IPS), which contains 30
million photographs of an estimated 16.9 million individuals.30 Nearly 20%
of those photographs are “civil,” in that they were submitted to the
government in the course of licensing, employment, security clearances,
military service, volunteer service, and immigration.31 The remainder are
“criminal,” in that they were submitted by state and federal agencies as
part of a lawful detention, arrest, or incarceration.32
But the NGI-IPS is not the only source of photographs and
identification information. The Department of State maintains a collection
of photographs from the Terrorist Screening Center database of “those
known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity,”
which can be searched using facial recognition technology.33 Local law
enforcement agencies maintain databases of suspected gang members,
which often include booking photographs.34 The use of these reference
databases, which may include information about people who have not been
convicted of any crimes but have come to the attention of law enforcement,
raise significant concerns about accuracy, fairness, and racial bias,
especially as people of color will be disproportionately and unfairly
enrolled in such databases.35
Nor is the NGI-IPS the only source of “civil” photographs and
identification, as a result of the expansion in government photo
identification systems in the past half century. Drivers licensing was not
required in all states until around 1960; now, over 87% of people over the

29

CPT REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
GAO FBI Report, supra note 9, at 10 n.23.
31
See id. at 11 (“The NGI-IPS database has two categories of photos: criminal identities (photos
submitted as part of a lawful detention, an arrest, or incarceration), and civil identities . . . . Over 80
percent of the photos in NGI-IPS are criminal.”).
32
Id.
33
See id. at 16 tbl.2 (noting that the Department of State uses the “Face Recognition on Demand”
system to search photos from the Terrorist Screening Center database).
34
See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, THE CALGANG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 2015-130 11
(2016), https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2015-130.pdf [perma.cc/WAR6-TCH7] (describing the
CalGang system, which, as of 2015, had the biographical information and booking photographs of
150,000 gang members or affiliate gang members).
35
See, e.g., Letter from Elaine M. Howle, CPA, State Auditor, to the Governor of Cal. &
Legislative Leaders (Aug. 11, 2016), in CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 34 (outlining audit findings
of inaccuracies and inadequate oversight in the CalGang Criminal Intelligence System); CPT REPORT,
supra note 5 (raising concerns about use of mug shots in reference databases, such as the inaccuracy of
the technology, the disproportionate effects on African-Americans, and potential restriction of free
speech); Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Watch Commander: Barack Obama’s Secret TerroristTracking System, by the Numbers, INTERCEPT (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:45 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2014/08/05/watch-commander [perma.cc/V2KG-ZCKP] (“Nearly half of the
people on the U.S. government’s widely shared database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any
known terrorist group . . . .”).
30
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age of sixteen in the United States have a driver’s license, and therefore
have registered their face, name, current address, and other personal
information with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Similarly, only seven
million U.S. passports were in circulation in 1989; as of 2016, over 131
million U.S. passports were in circulation,37 reflecting the number of
people who have registered their face, name, and nationality with the
Department of State.
Today, a government-issued photo ID is a necessary part of modern
life, whether it is for driving, traveling, purchasing alcohol, entering
government buildings, or verifying credit card purchases. While a more
detailed legal analysis of the uses of facial recognition technology would
require examining the specifics of the reference database used, what
matters for this Article’s thesis is that for years now people have been
unwittingly enrolling in government databases that could be used in the
future with facial recognition technology.
III.
THE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY TO IDENTIFY
PEOPLE ON THE STREETS IMPLICATES REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF
PRIVACY
The United States Supreme Court first rejected the axiom that privacy
does not exist in public places in United States v. Katz.38 In Katz, the FBI
had, without a warrant, eavesdropped on a telephone conversation of the
defendant, Charles Katz, who had made a phone call from a public
telephone booth partly constructed of glass.39 Because until then the Fourth
Amendment was understood as protecting the right to privacy in property
and prohibiting only trespass onto a constitutionally protected area such as
a home, both parties focused their arguments on whether a public
telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area.40 The Court,
however, rejected that framing of the issue, holding instead that “what [a
person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.”41 The Court found that Katz’s
conversations were constitutionally protected under this proper framing of
privacy interests because when he closed the door to the phone booth, he
36
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., Our Nation’s Highways: 2011,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter4.cfm [perma.cc/3ZQT-X3FV]
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
37
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. Passports & International Travel:
Passport Statistics, https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/statistics.html [perma.cc/
FJV6-2RXU] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
38
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39
Id. at 348, 352.
40
See id. at 351 (“Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties
have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the
petitioner placed his calls.”).
41
Id. at 351–52.
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protected the contents of the conversation from “the uninvited ear,” even if
he did not protect the fact that he had made a phone call from “the
intruding eye.”42
Katz established that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy interests
beyond those that are rooted in property rights, and, despite criticism of its
“subjective and unpredictable” approach,43 it remains the governing
framework for evaluating such privacy interests.44 Later cases analyzing
Katz and drawing on Justice Harlan’s concurrence in the case have
explained that, under this approach, the Fourth Amendment protects
legitimate or reasonable expectations of privacy where: (1) “the individual,
by his conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,” and (2) “the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”45
This Katz framework, properly viewed, strongly favors Fourth
Amendment protection against the suspicionless and surreptitious use of
facial recognition technology. Under Katz, the appropriate constitutional
inquiry is whether people in contemporary American society have the
reasonable expectation of privacy in identifying information about
themselves even as they expose their faces to public view by leaving their
homes and walking or driving down the street. The intuitively correct
answer is yes, and so is the answer that Katz’s two-step inquiry yields.
A. People Maintain Subjective Expectations of Privacy in Identity Even
While Out in Public.
Most people today exhibit subjective and actual expectations of
privacy in their identities even while they are out in public. In walking
down the street, we invite “the intruding eye” of strangers to glance at or
even examine our faces as we pass by, but we do not invite them to also
identify us by our names and addresses, much less occupation, immigration
status, criminal history, and other personal information. People do not walk
around in public announcing or displaying such identifying information, or
giving out such information in response to inquiries. We teach children not
to speak to strangers, and especially not to give out names and addresses to
strangers. In many places, we expect to be able to take trips to the
pharmacy to purchase sensitive items, or private trips to the doctor’s office
42

Id. at 352.
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (acknowledging that the Katz test,
which asks “whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable,” has often been criticized as “circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”).
44
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (explaining that Katz
supplemented, but did not supplant, the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis rooted in the propertybased approach to privacy).
45
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Katz,
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
43
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or the therapist’s office, or perhaps a quick trip to the grocery store in
pajamas, with the minimal risk of being recognized and of being required
to identify ourselves in public.46
The Supreme Court has affirmed this subjective expectation of privacy
in First Amendment cases protecting the right to speak anonymously, most
recently and explicitly in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York
v. Village of Stratton.47 There, a village ordinance required individuals to
obtain a license if they wanted to engage in door-to-door advocacy and
distribution of handbills.48 The court of appeals had rejected the First
Amendment challenge to this ordinance, holding that it did not implicate
constitutional interests in anonymous speech because a person already
reveals their identity by appearing at someone’s doorway to engage in
advocacy.49 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals’
reasoning conflicted with First Amendment precedent holding that the fact
that speakers “revealed their physical identities” did not foreclose the
consideration of the speakers’ “interest in maintaining their anonymity.” 50
Even though speakers who are known to the residents of the village
revealed their identities through face-to-face advocacy, strangers did not
lose their privacy interests in their identities by revealing their faces in
public.51 In short, people do not lose their expectations of privacy in their
identities by merely exposing their faces in public.
B. The Subjective Expectations of Privacy in Identity While Out in Public
Are Reasonable.
This subjective expectation of privacy in identity is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Although the Supreme Court itself
has acknowledged that there is “no talisman that determines in all cases
those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as

46

As discussed further below in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., the Supreme Court
held that a state law may require a person to identify themselves when a police stops the person as a
result of reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity. Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186–88 (2004). Short of that situation, however, a person
cannot be compelled to identify themselves while in public. See id. at 184 (noting that when a stop is
not based on “specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion,” the stop is impermissible)
(citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)).
47
536 U.S. 150 (2002).
48
See id. at 154 (“[The ordinance] provides that any canvasser who intends to go on private
property to promote a cause must obtain a ‘Solicitation Permit’ from the office of the mayor . . . .”).
49
Id. at 159, 166.
50
Id. at 167.
51
See id. (“The fact that circulators revealed their physical identities did not foreclose our
consideration of the circulator’s interest in maintaining their anonymity. In the Village, strangers to the
resident certainly maintain their anonymity . . . .”); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 341 (1995) (noting that the First Amendment generally protects the freedom a speaker “to
decide whether or not to disclose his or her true identity.”).
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reasonable,” cases applying Katz have identified a few factors that either
undermine or bolster the reasonableness of subjective expectations of
privacy. On the one hand, an expectation of privacy is unreasonable if the
information to be protected is exposed to the public or if it has already
been shared with third parties. On the other hand, an expectation of privacy
is reasonable if it comports with social norms and the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution. I evaluate the expectation of privacy in
identity under each of these factors to illustrate that this expectation is one
that society has generally been prepared to recognize as reasonable.
1. Identity Is Not Exposed to the Public Because of Practical
Obscurity
Under Katz, an expectation of privacy is not reasonable if the
information at issue was “knowingly expose[d] to the public.”53 The
Supreme Court has used this reasoning to deny privacy protections to
people’s faces and other physical characteristics that are exposed to the
public, noting that a person cannot “reasonably expect that his face will be
a mystery to the world.”54 The Court has also relied on this reasoning to
deny privacy protections to visual surveillance from locations that are
accessible to the public: thus, in California v. Ciraolo, the Court allowed
the warrantless naked-eye inspection of the defendant’s property from
1,000 feet in the air where private and commercial flights frequently
travel,55 and in Florida v. Riley, it allowed the same at 400 feet where
helicopters travel.56 The Court has also denied privacy protections to visual
surveillance augmented by limited forms of technology: in United States v.
Knotts, the Court permitted the warrantless use of a “beeper,” a primitive
tracking device, to supplement naked-eye surveillance in following a car
on public roads for a short period of time.57 Comparing the use of the
beeper to the use of a searchlight, the Court held that “[n]othing in the
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
and technology afforded them in this case.”58
Unfortunately, this “public exposure” doctrine has been extended
52
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); see also Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (noting that reasonable privacy expectations need to be redefined as
technologies continue to evolve).
53
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the
public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
54
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding that a person does not have an
expectation of privacy in his voice).
55
476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
56
488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989).
57
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (“[T]here is no indication that the beeper
was used in any way to reveal information . . . that would not have been visible to the naked eye . . . .”).
58
Id. at 282–83.
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without adequate scrutiny to a type of technology that is similar in some
respects to facial recognition technology—license plate look-ups and
scanners. Using license plate look-ups and scanners, the police now have
the capacity to retrieve identifying information about the car’s owner in
real-time, including name, address, date of birth, and outstanding warrants
and tickets.59 Every federal appellate court to confront the constitutionality
of this practice has held that there is no constitutional protection against the
suspicionless use of license plate look-ups because license plates are
publicly displayed on a vehicle in plain view of law enforcement.60
But, as Judge Moore noted in dissenting from United States v. Ellison,
the Sixth Circuit decision rejecting the right to privacy against the
suspicionless use of license plate look-ups, fixating on the feasibility of
visual surveillance in this context “misses the crux of the issue,” not least
because it “pays short shrift” to how the visual surveillance is used with
information retrieved from a database.61 In license plate look-ups as in
facial recognition technology, the information that is private is not our
faces or “the particular combination of letters and numerals that make up
[the] license-plate number,”62 but the aggregation of general information
that a certain car or person was observed at a certain date, time, and place,
with specific identifying information held in a government database.
59
For example, in State v. Donis, a police officer conducted a random license plate check using a
mobile data unit that retrieved the motorist’s name, address, date of birth, and driver’s license number,
as well as other information. State v. Donis, 723 A.2d 35, 36 (N.J. 1998). In People v. Bushey, the
defendant claimed that an officer similarly retrieved the motorist’s name and address without any
suspicion. See Brief of Appellant, People v. Bushey, No. 2016-00032 (N.Y. 2016). The court in
Bushey, however, noted that the argument that the officer may have accessed private information was
not preserved for review and that the officer had testified that the only relevant factor that he
discovered before stopping the defendant as that his registration was suspended due to unpaid parking
tickets. People v. Bushey, 2017 NY Slip Op 03560, n.2 (May 4, 2017).
60
See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 2006) (“No argument can be
made that a motorist seeks to keep the information on his license plate private. The very purpose of a
license plate number . . . is to provide identifying information to law enforcement officials and
others.”); Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[a]
motorist has no privacy interest in her license plate number”); United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d
1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that because a license plate is on the outside of a car, it is subject
to seizure). One state court, the New Jersey Supreme Court, recognized concerns with suspicionless
license plate look-ups that yield identifying information and ordered modifications to the system so that
identifying information cannot be displayed unless there is reasonable suspicion. See Donis, 723 A.2d
at 40 (N.J. 1998) (“[T]he data displays of the [mobile data terminal]s should be reprogrammed to
provide for a two-step process. In the first step . . . . [t]he registered owner’s personal information
would not be displayed. If the original inquiry disclosed a basis for further police action, then the police
officer would proceed to the second step, which would allow access to the ‘personal information’ of the
registered owner . . . .”).
61
Ellison, 462 F.3d at 566–67 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore frames the appropriate
question in analyzing license plate look-ups in the following manner: “[E]ven if there is no privacy
interest in the license-plate number per se, can the police, without any measure of heightened suspicion
or other constraint on their discretion, conduct a search using the license-plate number to access
information about the vehicle and its operator that may not otherwise be public or accessible by the
police without heightened suspicion?” Id. at 567.
62
Id. at 566.
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This aggregate, identifying portrait of a person that facial recognition
technology enables is not exposed to the public simply because it is
theoretically possible for a law enforcement officer to identify a person on
a street through the combination of visual surveillance and a manual
review of records. In United States v. Maynard, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia rejected this notion in a case involving location
surveillance of a car using a GPS device.63 In Maynard, the government
had attached a GPS device to the defendant’s car without a warrant and
monitored its whereabouts for twenty-four hours a day for a month.64 The
court distinguished the case from Knotts because of the difference between
the information that could be gleaned by the limited use of the beeper and
the information that could be gleaned from GPS surveillance.65 As the
court explained:
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow
someone during a single journey as he goes to the market or
returns home from work. It is another thing entirely for that
stranger to pick up the scent again the next day and the day
after that, week in and week out, dogging his prey until he
has identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores
that make up that person's hitherto private routine.66
The Maynard court concluded that aggregate information about a
person’s movement for a one-month period is not actually exposed to the
public because “the likelihood a stranger would observe all those
movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.”67 Nor is it
constructively exposed to the public, even if each of the individual
movements was exposed to the public, because it would be practically
difficult for a person to observe each of those movements and because the
aggregate whole revealed more private information about a person—
including their habits, affiliations, and beliefs—than “any individual trip
viewed in isolation.”68
In coming to this conclusion, the court drew on case law from the
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). The court noted that in United
States Department of Justice v. Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of
Press,69 the Supreme Court found a privacy interest under FOIA in “rap
sheets” that contain people’s identifying information, including date of
63
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
64
Id. at 555.
65
Id. at 556.
66
Id. at 560.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 561–62.
69
Id. at 561 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters’ Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S.
749, 764–65 (1989)).
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birth and physical characteristics, as well as a history of arrests, charges,
convictions, and incarcerations in every jurisdiction around the country.
The Court held that although each individual criminal record contained in
the rap sheets was a public record that would be available to those who
searched each courthouse file, county archives, and local police station in
the country, the privacy of the aggregate summary of those records was
protected by “practical obscurity”—that is, the practical difficulty of
compiling the information.70 Thus people maintained a privacy interest in
the aggregate information “located in a single clearinghouse” even where
individual records within that clearinghouse were public.71
The Supreme Court granted review in Maynard, which was re-named
on appeal as United States v. Jones.72 The majority opinion in Jones
affirmed Maynard on the alternate theory that the warrantless attachment
of the GPS implicated the Fourth Amendment’s protection of property
interests and did not validate or reject the Maynard court’s theory of
privacy.73 But the five justices writing separately in Jones endorsed the
conclusion in Maynard that location monitoring using GPS itself
implicated the Fourth Amendment.74 Justice Alito, concurring in the
judgment and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, found
reasonable the expectation of privacy in one-month of the defendant’s
movement history because of societal expectation that law enforcement
agencies “would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a
very long period” for most offenses.75 Justice Sotomayor, writing in
concurrence, agreed with Justice Alito’s conclusion and echoed the
Maynard court’s concerns about the comprehensive record of movement
that can be gathered and revealed by GPS surveillance and the information
it may reveal about the person’s “familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.”76 Five justices therefore effectively endorsed the
view that the mere possibility of visual surveillance of individual vehicular
trips from a public location does not undermine reasonable expectations of
privacy. 77
70

Reporters’ Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 762–64, 780.
See id. at 764–65 (finding the congressional intent “to protect the privacy of rap-sheet subjects,
and a concomitant recognition of the power of compilations to affect personal privacy that outstrips the
combined power of the bits of information contained within”).
72
132 S. Ct. 945, 948–49 (2012).
73
Id. at 953–54.
74
See id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least,
‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.’”); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I conclude that the lengthy monitoring that occurred in
this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.”).
75
Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
76
Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
77
Several state courts have also adopted similar approaches to privacy in GPS cases under their
state constitutions. See, e.g., New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (N.Y. 2009)
71

2017]

PUBLIC FACES, PRIVATE IDENTITIES

1607

The approach of Maynard and the five justices in Jones could be
extended to argue that the aggregate information revealed as a result of the
use of facial recognition technology on the streets is not publicly exposed,
even if that information is about a person’s presence in a location at one
moment in time rather than their movement over a longer period. First, as
explained above, the totality of information that could be revealed when
facial recognition is used to identify an individual on the street is not
information that is actually exposed to the public.78 People do not walk
around with signs announcing our identifying information. Indeed, the
privacy interest implicated by the identification of people walking on the
street is far greater than the interest implicated by license plate look-ups,
because people do not, and are not required to, walk around with signs
displaying identification information that they registered to the
government.79
Second, that information is not constructively exposed to the public
because of “practical obscurity.” Without facial recognition technology
and a clearinghouse of information, it would require a “super recognizer,”
a person with extraordinary skill at recognizing faces in crowds, to identify
an individual and to retrieve information about that person as they are
walking by. Research suggests that such “super recognizers” exist and that
at least one police department is taking advantage of their abilities in
pursuing investigations,80 but the limited number of people with such skills
necessarily ensures that their skills are only used for investigations that
need them. Facial recognition lifts the resource constraints that have
served as a practical protection for privacy, just as the advent of GPS
surveillance lifted the resource constraints that ensured that intrusive,
prolonged location surveillance was employed only against the most
serious offenders that warranted the time and attention of multiple police

(recognizing that GPS monitoring “yields . . . a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but
by easy inference, of our associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a
few—and of the pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits”); Washington v. Jackson, 76 P.3d
217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (“In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of
places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails and foibles.”).
78
See supra Section III.A (providing examples of information not typically visually available to
the public such as names, addresses, occupation, immigration status, and criminal history).
79
In cases involving license plate look-ups, courts have noted that “[t]he very purpose of a license
plate number, like that of a Vehicle Identification Number, is to provide identifying information to law
enforcement officials and others.” See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 2006);
see also People v. Bushey, 2017 NY Slip Op 03560 (rejecting any expectation of privacy against
license plate look-ups because one of the important objectives of motor vehicle registration is to
“facilitate the identification of the owner” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
80
See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Detectives Who Never Forget a Face, NEW YORKER (Aug. 22,
2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/22/londons-super-recognizer-police-force
[perma.cc/95YY-Z8CE] (“In Room 901 of New Scotland Yard, the police had assembled half a dozen
officers who shared an unusual talent: they all had a preternatural ability to recognize human faces.”).
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81

officers over days and weeks.
Finally, the information revealed by the use of facial recognition
clearly implicates privacy interests that are different from, and more than,
the sum of its parts. A database of a person’s photograph, name, address,
and other personal information on its own holds a wealth of private
information about a person. But that information is far more valuable when
it is combined with an image depicting the person’s presence at a protest,
the person’s entry into a gay bar, an abortion clinic, or a mosque, or the
person’s interactions with another identifiable person.82 That these discrete
pieces of information may be accessible to law enforcement does not mean
that the combination of those pieces of information is exposed to the
public.
2. Identity in Public Is Not Subject to the Third-Party Doctrine
Because it Is Not Voluntarily Shared with Government Entities.
Under Katz’s progeny, the Supreme Court has held that information
loses its privacy protection where it is voluntarily disclosed to a thirdparty. This doctrine, known as the “third-party doctrine,” developed in the
1970s—but, as with the public exposure doctrine just discussed, should not
apply to the use of facial recognition technology.
In United States v. Miller, decided in 1976, the Court held that there
was no Fourth Amendment right to privacy in bank records because these
records “contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”83 The
Court found that “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”84 This was so even if the information was shared to a third
party “on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”85
In following Miller in 1979, the Court further held in Smith v.
Maryland that there was no Fourth Amendment right to privacy in
telephone dialing records of a home line.86 The Court found that any
subjective expectations of privacy in numbers dialed were not reasonable
because “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”87 In short, because a person
voluntarily chooses to share phone dialing information with the telephone
81
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that GPS devices have made longterm monitoring “relatively easy and cheap”).
82
See New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (N.Y. 2009).
83
425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
84
Id. at 443.
85
Id.
86
442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
87
Id. at 743–44.
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company in making a call, the person has “assumed the risk that the
company would reveal to the police the numbers he dialed.”88
But the third-party doctrine does not apply to the use of facial
recognition technology on the streets for the same reason that the public
exposure doctrine does not apply. In Miller and Smith, the government
sought to obtain only the limited business records that were in the
possession of the third-party businesses pursuant to ordinary business
practices. With facial recognition, however, law enforcement not only
seeks access to identification records already existing in some government
database, but seeks to dip into that database to generate new information
that links a person’s location with the identifying information. People have
not handed over to any third-party the aggregate information generated by
the use of facial recognition technology— the information of where they
are in a given moment in time combined with identifying information.89
Moreover, that identifying information exists in a government database
does not mean that any government agency has the right to access it for
law-enforcement purposes. Ferguson v. City of Charleston establishes one
of the limitations to such access.90 In that case, a public hospital worked
with law enforcement to set forth procedures by which the hospital staff
would test pregnant patients suspected of drug use and refer any positive
tests to law enforcement for arrest and prosecution.91 Even though medical
records are prototypical of records that are always shared with third parties,
namely doctors, the Court did not apply the third-party doctrine in that
case.92 Instead, it held that the patients maintained a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” that the results of their diagnostic tests “will not be
shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”93 As in Ferguson,
when people share their identifying information with one government
entity for a limited purpose, they do not voluntarily consent to the use of
that information in combination with facial recognition for all future law
enforcement purposes.
This leads to an important point about voluntariness. Miller and Smith
held that the expectations of privacy in those cases were unreasonable
because the defendants voluntarily agreed to share their information with
third-parties when they elected to use a service offered by a private
88

Id. at 744.
In certain instances this type of information will be in the hands of the third party. If a person
chooses to email a friend using Gmail that she is in a certain location, the government may try to access
that information through Gmail. If a person is carrying a cell phone, the government may try to access
location information through the cell phone provider. But these are separate questions from whether the
third-party doctrine applies to the government attempting to access this information through the use of
facial recognition technology.
90
532 U.S. 67, 85–86 (2001).
91
Id. at 70–73.
92
See id. at 78.
93
Id.
89
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business. The same cannot be said for those whose pictures and personal
information are recorded by the government in the course of criminal
proceedings and enrolled in a government reference database—to the
contrary, they are disclosing this information under coercion. More
broadly, the same also cannot be said for a person’s decision to forfeit their
private identifying information to the government in order to apply for a
benefit that only the government can offer and that is critical to modern
life, such as government-issued photo identification. In a similar vein,
some courts have rejected the notion that people voluntarily share their
location information with their cell phone providers by their decision to
use their cell phone because a cell phone is a modern necessity.95
Finally, Miller and Smith were decided in such a different
technological reality that it may no longer make sense to apply the thirdparty doctrine to today’s world, as Justice Sotomayor posited in her Jones
concurrence.96 The information that could be accumulated and analyzed
about a person in the 1970s, whether through bank records or through
telephone dialing records, was limited by technology and storage costs. By
comparison, today the speed at which society produces data has
accelerated—according to one announcement, 90% of the data in the world
has been generated in two years.97 The Supreme Court already recognized
in the 1970s that the “accumulation of vast amounts of personal
94
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“[The] petitioner had to convey [the
dialed] number to the telephone company . . . if he wished to complete his call.”); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (“All documents obtained . . . contain only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks . . . .”).
95
See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F.
Supp. 2d 113, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The fiction that the vast majority of the American population
consents to warrantless government access to the records of a significant share of their movements by
‘choosing’ to carry a cell phone must be rejected”); Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504, 523 (Fla. 2014)
(rejecting the application of Miller and Smith to location records held by a cell phone provider because
“[r]equiring a cell phone user to turn off the phone just to assure privacy from government intrusion
that can reveal a detailed and intimate picture of the user’s life places an unreasonable burden on the
user to forego necessary use of his cell phone, a device now considered essential by much of the
populace”). But see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding
that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cellphone carrier’s business records
showing the cell tower locations of his phone calls); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th
Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding that a defendants had no reasonable expectations of privacy in historical
cell-site location information), cert. filed, No. 16-6308 (Sept. 26, 2016); United States v. Carpenter,
819 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Carriers necessarily track their customers’ phones across different
cell-site sectors to connect and maintain their customers’ calls. And carriers keep records of these data
to find weak spots in their network and to determine whether roaming charges apply, among other
purposes. Thus, the cell-site data—like mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP addresses—are
information that facilitate personal communications, rather than part of the content of those
communications themselves. The government’s collection of business records containing these data
therefore is not a search”), cert. filed, No. 16-402 (Sept. 26, 2016).
96
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing
doubt over the third-party doctrine given that, in the digital age, “people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks”).
97
What is Big Data?, IBM, https://www-01.ibm.com/software/data/bigdata/what-is-big-data.html
[perma.cc/SJ4R-47U7] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
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information in computerized data banks or other massive government
files” raises significant privacy concerns, especially when not accompanied
by adequate protections against unwarranted disclosure.98 The massive
databases that are possible today, and that are readily accessible by facial
recognition technology, render the third-party doctrine of Miller and Smith
anachronistic to the privacy threats that exist today.
3. Social Norms Validate the Privacy in Identity.
The previous two sections discussed factors that undermine reasonable
expectations of privacy, but what about factors that bolster reasonableness
of expectations in privacy? The Supreme Court has stated that expectations
of privacy are reasonable where they are “established by general social
norms.”99
On the one hand, general social norms inform us to expect some level
of intrusive behavior from others in society while we are in public spaces.
In California v. Greenwood, the Court held that general social norms
undermined the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy in the
contents of garbage bags left on the streets because “[i]t is common
knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public.”100
On the other hand, society frowns on intrusive behavior in public that
crosses a certain threshold. Thus, in Bond v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that a law enforcement agent violated reasonable expectations
of privacy by squeezing a bag that a traveler had stored in the overhead
storage area of a bus.101 The Court explained that while a bus passenger
expects that his bag may be handled, “[h]e does not expect that other
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an
exploratory manner.”102 Bond drew a distinction between the minimallyintrusive surveillance that can be expected in public, such as the aerial
surveillance in Ciraolo and Riley, and the tactile intrusion that occurred in
the case.103
98
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977) (citation omitted) (rejecting challenge to a state
prescription database, but recognizing concern regarding unwarranted disclosures of personal
information resulting from government collection of information); see also id. at 606–07 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the
potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not
demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology.”).
99
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 51 n.3 (1988) (quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 428 (1981)); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12 (1978) (stating that
reasonableness of expectations of privacy can be rooted in “understandings that are recognized or
permitted by society”).
100
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
101
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000).
102
Id. at 338–39.
103
See id. at 337 (“Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual
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Lower courts have recognized that, even without the tactile intrusion of
Bond, intensive visual surveillance in public can cross the line of socially
acceptable norms. Some courts have therefore held that prolonged video
surveillance of the exterior of a person’s home, even if taken from a
lawfully accessible location, violates reasonable expectations of privacy.104
Some state courts have held that aerial surveillance violates reasonable
expectations where the airplane hovers above a person’s property and
causes an intrusion into a sphere of privacy that exceeds the “brief flyover”
visual surveillance of Ciraolo and Riley.105
Facial recognition surveillance, like these forms of more intrusive
surveillance, crosses the boundaries of socially acceptable behavior in
public. Although the Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the sources
of such norms, one place to search for norms is in sociology literature. In
the 1970s, sociologist Erving Goffman coined the term “civil inattention”
to describe the social rules that people follow in navigating pedestrian
traffic in the streets.106 While walking on the streets, we constantly scan
our surroundings, including others who are sharing the streets with us. But
this scan is limited to a “simple body check,” a brief glance to ensure that
the two people are not on a collision path.107 Staring at a person’s facial
features—the non-technological equivalent to facial recognition—is
socially unacceptable and “may be construed as an encroachment or threat
of some kind.”108 The natural defense of those caught staring at passersby
in public is to “enact a scan that gives the appearance of happening to fall
upon the victim the moment he happens to look at the scanner.”109
Goffman further explained that this level of information control over
one’s identity is necessary to navigate the various spaces in people’s
lives—spaces where we are likely to be known personally and spaces
where we “can expect to remain anonymous, eventful to no one.”110 And
while Goffman focused his analysis on those who he believed would suffer
inspection.”); see also supra Section III. B.1 (discussing Riley and Ciraolo).
104
See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
prolonged video surveillance of the curtilage of the defendants’ home from a utility pole implicated the
Fourth Amendment); Shafer v. City of Boulder, 896 F. Supp. 2d 915, 931–32 (D. Nev. 2012)
(recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy against constant video surveillance of defendant’s
backyard for fifty-six days). But see United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2016)
(holding that a ten-week video surveillance of the defendant’s farm from a camera located on top of a
public utility pole on the road did not implicate the Fourth Amendment).
105
New Mexico v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1172 (N.M. 2015); see also, e.g., Vermont v. Bryant,
950 A.2d 467, 480–81 (Vt. 2008) (holding the same under the Vermont State Constitution).
106
ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 209 (1971).
107
Id. at 12.
108
Id. at 132.
109
Id. at 127; see also id. at 59 (those who seek to stare at others in a fixed location must relegate
themselves to the “few places available that are sufficiently far removed from other persons present”).
Other scholars have written on the need for privacy in public spaces. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy
of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 555–56 (2006) (discussing work of Irwin Altman).
110
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 83 (1963).
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stigma if certain personal information about themselves were revealed, he
recognized that every person has some situation in which they will need to
manage the disclosure of their identities.111
Lyn H. Lofland, writing about urban public space in the 1990s, also
noted that civil inattention “makes possible copresence without
commingling, awareness without engrossment, courtesy without
conversation”—and that it is “the sine qua non of city life.”112 She
concluded that “when humans in the public realm appear to ignore one
another, they do so not out of psychological distress but out of a ritual
regard, and their response is not the asocial one of ‘shut down’ but the
fully social one of politeness.”113 Society depends on the norm of
maintaining some respectful distance from fellow humans as each person
goes around their daily lives.
Goffman coined the term “civil inattention” decades ago, but recent
polls confirm that privacy in identity in public places continues to be a
valued social norm. According to a 2015 poll conducted by Pew Research,
over 60% of the American public believe that being able to travel in public
without always being identified is an important societal value.114 In further
support of this belief, 93% of those surveyed believed it important to
maintain control of who can get information about them.115 In a separate
Pew Research survey, 95% of those surveyed responded that their social
security number—the ultimate identifier—was sensitive information, more
sensitive than health records or the content of phone conversation.116
There is widespread recognition, evident in popular culture as well as
the media coverage on this topic, that the use of facial recognition to
identify individuals in public will violate the prevailing norms of
society.117 The Fourth Amendment should protect these norms of privacy
111
See id. at 127 (“The most fortunate of normal is likely to have his half-hidden failing, and for
every little failing there is a social occasion when it will loom large, creating a shameful gap between
virtual and actual social identity.”).
112
LOFLAND, supra note 1, at 30.
113
Id.
114
PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS HOLD STRONG VIEWS ABOUT PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(May 19, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-securityand-surveillance/pi_15-05-20_privacysecurityattd00/ [perma.cc/8TBB-C9ZC].
115
Id.
116
MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacyperceptions/ [perma.cc/GRS3-3T53].
117
See, e.g., Andrew Liszewski, This Creepy Facial Recognition System Knows How Often You
Visit a Store, GIZMODO (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5959723/this-creepy-facialrecognition-system-knows-how-often-you-visit-a-store [https://perma.cc/7QY4-H6VDF]; Richard
Newton, You Are Being Watched: Face Recognition Deemed ‘Creepy’ By UK Shoppers, GUARDIAN
(July 27, 2015, 2:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/small-business-network/2015/jul/27/you-arebeing-watched-face-recognition-creepy-uk-shoppers [perma.cc/V2CD-QKM7]; Singer, supra note 26;
Keith Wagstaff, Washington Frets Over ‘Minority Report’-Style Facial Recognition Technology, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/washington-frets-over-minorityreport-style-facial-recognition-technology-2D11692143 [https://perma.cc/7HAU-PEDU].
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that exist today.
4. The Intent of the Framers of the Constitution to Prohibit
Indiscriminate Searches, Prevent Arbitrary and Discriminate
Intrusions, and Support Democratic Principles Validates the
Privacy in Identity.
Courts also look to the “intention of the framers of the Fourth
Amendment” in determining the reasonableness of expectations of
privacy.118 In the case of facial recognition, there is of course no explicit
evidence of intent—it is safe to say that the Founding Fathers could not
have imagined the world of electronic databases that exist today, much less
the technology that can match that data with a face in real-time. But facial
recognition impinges on several concepts that were critical to the Framers
in crafting the Constitution, including the prohibition on general searches,
the prevention of arbitrary and indiscriminate intrusion on privacy, and the
preservation of a democracy. As some judges have already suggested,
these factors should be used as guide posts in determining the
reasonableness of expectations of privacy in the modern world.119
i.

The potential for indiscriminate searches.

In crafting the Constitution, and in particular the Fourth Amendment,
the Framers sought to prevent “indiscriminate searches and seizures” like
those that were conducted under the authority of general warrants.120
Courts have therefore noted the need to be vigilant against technologies
that enable “dragnet-type law enforcement practices”121 and “programs of
mass surveillance.”122 In Knotts, the Court rejected the defendant’s
118

O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J.,
concurring) (rejecting Maynard’s approach to reasonable expectations of privacy but suggesting that he
would determine the constitutionality of GPS surveillance by exploring whether there are colorable
arguments that “the use of GPS technology to engage in long-term tracking is analogous to general
warrants that the Fourth Amendment was designed to curtail . . . the technology’s potential to be used
arbitrarily or because it may alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society”), rev’d, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also Jones,
132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the “attributes of GPS monitoring” that she
would take into account when considering the existence of reasonable expectations of privacy,
including the potential of the technology to “evade[] the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices” and to “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
120
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (“It is familiar history that indiscriminate
searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that
motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 625–27 (1886) (describing the history of general warrants).
121
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983).
122
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting constitutional challenge
to warrantless GPS surveillance in the case but noting that “[s]hould government someday decide to
institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide
whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search”).
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suggestion that beeper surveillance would permit twenty-four hour
surveillance of any citizen in the country without judicial knowledge or
supervision, but stated that “if such dragnet type law enforcement practices
. . . should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”123
That time may arrive with advanced uses of facial recognition
technology. When facial recognition is used with real-time video
surveillance, mass surveillance is the reality, not only a mere possibility.
Other uses of facial recognition technology, like a mobile scanner that can
be pointed at any person the street, also facilitate the indiscriminate uses of
the technology because they, by their surreptitious nature, “evade[] the
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: limited
police resources and community hostility.”124 Given this potential for mass
surveillance, the use of facial recognition technologies should be subject to
some Fourth Amendment regulation.
ii.

The potential for arbitrary and discriminatory intrusion by
the police.

At the core of the Fourth Amendment is “[t]he security of one’s
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police.”125 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has prohibited police officers from stopping and demanding
identification from a person walking on the street,126 or for that matter from
a person driving down the road,127 without suspicion because “the risk of
arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.”128 It is only
when officers have reasonable suspicion for stopping a person in the first
place that the law enforcement interest in demanding to know the person’s
name exceeds the privacy interest in one’s identity.129
Facial recognition technology subverts these long-standing Fourth
Amendment protections by allowing the police to discover the identities of
anyone on the streets, and without any constitutional limitations, the
technology will likely result in widespread abuse and misuse. A recent
123

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
125
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and enforceable against the States
under the Due Process Clause).
126
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1979).
127
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
128
Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661).
129
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004) (“The
reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined ‘by balancing its intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests’. .
. . A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent
with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (internal citation
omitted)).
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Associated Press report uncovered evidence of nationwide abuse and
misuse of confidential law enforcement databases to learn private
information about romantic partners, journalists, and others for reasons
unrelated to law enforcement.130 An audit of law enforcement access to a
license records database in Minnesota in 2012 found that more than half of
the users audited had queried people with the same last name or
disproportionately searched for people of one sex.131 In Florida, more than
400 incidents of misuse of the state’s Driver and Vehicle Information
Database was reported in an 18-month period starting in 2014.132
This pattern of abuse and misuse is also likely to disproportionately
impact communities of color. Even when well-established case law has
required reasonable suspicion for law enforcement to stop individuals,
people of color have been stopped disproportionately and discriminatorily
targeted by the police.133 In a world where the police are free to direct
surveillance technologies to anyone without any suspicion, the scrutiny is
likely to fall on communities of color. As Justice Sotomayor noted
recently, “it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of
this type of [suspicionless] scrutiny [by the police].”134
The impact on these communities will be both psychological and
physical. As Judge Moore noted in dissent in Ellison, the case regarding
the suspicionless use of license plate look-ups, there is real, cognizable
harm in “[t]he psychological invasion that results from knowing that one’s
personal information is subject to search by the police, for no reason . . .
.”135 This is the psychological privacy harm that Katz protects even when
there is no intrusion on property interests.136
But the harm of facial recognition technology will not stop at the
130
Sadie Gurman & Eric Tucker, AP: Across US, Police Officers Abuse Confidential Databases,
Associated
Press
(Sept.
28,
2016,
12:28
AM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43/ap-across-us-police-officers-abuse-confidential-databases
[perma.cc/4U8L-FJV6].
131
OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., EVALUATION REPORT: LAW
ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF STATE DATABASES 25–26 (2013), http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/
ped/pedrep/ledatabase.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS7W-PYU9]; Eric Roper, Audit Finds Common Misuse
of Minnesota Driver Data, STAR TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2013, 5:56 AM), http://www.startribune.com/feb-21audit-finds-common-misuse-of-minnesota-driver-data/192090631/?c=y&page=all&prepage=
1#continue [https://perma.cc/SQ79-HDL5].
132
Howard Altman, Misuse of Florida’s Driver Database Is Often Personal, TAMPA BAY ONLINE
(Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.tbo.com/news/crime/misuse-of-floridas-driver-database-is-often-personal20160827/ [https://perma.cc/4PUX-SRL3].
133
See e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he City
adopted a policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local
crime suspect data. This has resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of blacks and
Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Both statistical and anecdotal evidence showed
that minorities are indeed treated differently than whites.”).
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Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 568 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, dissenting).
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See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled
to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
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psychological if the technology is used to manufacture a reason to stop and
investigate a person—that is, if it is used not only to retrieve identifying
information, but also information about a person’s outstanding warrants,
tickets, or other information that will give police officers “reasonable
suspicion” or “probable cause” to stop a person. Unfortunately, in Utah v.
Strieff, the Supreme Court recently approved an arrest and a search
incident to arrest that occurred after an initial illegitimate stop of the
person turned up an outstanding warrant.137
Strieff, however, should be limited to its facts and should not apply to
endorse law enforcement’s suspicionless use of facial recognition
technology. The Supreme Court’s decision in Strieff was premised on its
belief that the suspicionless warrant check that occurred in the case was
“an isolated instance of negligence” and therefore did not raise the specter
of dragnet searches.138 As explained above, the government’s decision to
allow suspicionless use of facial recognition technology is a decision to
allow dragnet searches of people’s identities.139 Such use of facial
recognition would create precisely the world that Justice Sotomayor fears
in her dissent in Strieff—a world where officers can “warrant-check
random joggers, dog walkers, and lemonade vendors just to ensure they
pose no threat to anyone else.”140
Such a world would significantly alter the current balance of
interactions between people and law enforcement. As Justice Sotomayor
noted:
Outstanding warrants are surprisingly common. When a
person with a traffic ticket misses a fine payment or court
appearance, a court will issue a warrant. When a person on
probation drinks alcohol or breaks curfew, a court will issue
a warrant. The States and Federal Government maintain
databases with over 7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast
majority of which appear to be for minor offenses. Even
these sources may not track the “staggering” numbers of
warrants, “ ‘drawers and drawers' ” full, that many cities
issue for traffic violations and ordinance infractions. The
county in this case has had a “backlog” of such warrants. The
Department of Justice recently reported that in the town of
Ferguson, Missouri, with a population of 21,000, 16,000
137
See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (“We hold that the evidence . . . seized as part of [the officer’s]
search incident to arrest is admissible because his discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the
connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized . . . .”).
138
Id. at 2063.
139
See supra Section III.B.4(i).
140
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2067 (2016) (internal citations omitted) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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With the number of outstanding warrants and tickets, which
themselves are known to disproportionately and unfairly impact
communities of color,142 the suspicionless use of facial recognition to
identify person’s outstanding warrants and tickets will result in an
exponential increase in the number of people who are subjected to “[t]he
indignity of the [law enforcement] stop” as they go about their daily
lives.143 These stops have serious consequences beyond the momentary
detention, including the potential of an intrusive search and an escalating
encounter that could result in a violent end.144 The Fourth Amendment
needs to be interpreted to intervene against such a reality.
iii.

The potential to undermine fundamental values of
democracy

Finally, the Constitution exists “to safeguard fundamental values.”145
Facial recognition has the potential to undermine those fundamental
values, including many that are enshrined in the Bill of Rights apart from
the Fourth Amendment. Used to monitor those engaged in free speech and
advocacy, it may infringe on the First Amendment right to anonymous
141

Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
For example, although marijuana is used at comparable rates by whites and blacks, according
to data from 2010, “a black person was 3.73 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession
than a white person.” ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 9 (2013). In the report
on the Ferguson Police Department, the U.S. Department of Justice noted the cumulative impact of
disparate impact:
African Americans are more likely to be searched but less likely to have
contraband found on them; more likely to receive a citation following a stop and
more likely to receive multiple citations at once; more likely to be arrested; more
likely to have force used against them; more likely to have their case last longer
and require more encounters with the municipal court; more likely to have an
arrest warrant issued against them by the municipal court; and more likely to be
arrested solely on the basis of an outstanding warrant.
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71 (2015).
143
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
144
See id. at 2070 (“The indignity of the stop is not limited to an officer telling you that you look
like a criminal. The officer may next ask for your ‘consent’ to inspect your bag or purse without telling
you that you can decline. Regardless of your answer, he may order you to stand ‘helpless, perhaps
facing a wall with [your] hands raised.’ If the officer thinks you might be dangerous, he may then
‘frisk’ you for weapons. . . . ‘A thorough search [may] be made of [your] arms and armpits, waistline
and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.’ . . . For
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to a stranger—all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (“What we do know is that the Framers were
men who focused on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard
fundamental values which would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth.”), abrogated by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991).

2017]

PUBLIC FACES, PRIVATE IDENTITIES

1619

146

speech. Used to monitor travel, it may infringe on the freedom of
movement.147 Used to collect and disclose private information about a
person, such as their medical conditions, it may infringe on the right to
informational privacy.148
More broadly, constant and dragnet facial recognition brings the
society closer to a system of national identification, in which the
government has the power and authority to identify and locate an
individual at any moment. As Professor Richard Sobel has argued in the
context of the proposal to create national identity cards, such systems
“fundamentally contradict the bases of the American system of
governance.”149 Identification systems “have a long history of being used
for social control and discrimination,”150 including in slavery,151 in the
Holocaust,152 and in Japanese-American internment.153 Such systems
contradict American principles and freedoms and “demean[] political and
personal identity by transforming personhood from an intrinsic quality
inhering in individuals . . . [into] an attribute of bureaucratic and
computerized systems.”154 As Professor Sobel concludes: “The spontaneity
of human existence, the right to be let alone, the seclusion of privacy, and
the pursuit of happiness need to be revered and preserved.”155
In her Strieff dissent, Justice Sotomayor sounded in similar sentiment
in opposing a search that resulted from an unlawful stop and warrant
check:
By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double
consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black,
guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your legal
status at any time. . . . It implies that you are not a citizen of a
democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to

146
See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 246–51 (“There is little doubt that public camera surveillance
can infringe First Amendment values”); see also supra Section III.A.
147
See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 262–63 (discussing case law and concluding that the case law
“suggests that public surveillance, even when targeting actions not protected by the First Amendment,
can infringe interests in locomotion and statis to a legally cognizable degree”).
148
The Supreme Court has referenced, but not clarified, the concept of right to information
privacy against the disclosure of personal information. See Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v.
Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (assuming, but not deciding, whether a constitutional right to
informational privacy applies). However, circuit courts have recognized such a right in various
instances. See e.g., Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing the right to
privacy in confidentiality of one’s HIV status).
149
Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification Systems,
15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 319, 320 (2002).
150
Id. at 343.
151
Id.
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Id. at 344.
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Id. at 348–49.
154
Id. at 320.
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Id. at 382.

1620

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

be cataloged.

[Vol. 49:1591

156

Dragnet use of facial recognition technology opens the door precisely
to the cataloguing of individuals as they go about their daily lives. It is
fundamentally inconsistent with the values of democracy.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to advance an argument against the
suspicionless use of facial recognition technology using the Katz
framework. There are, of course, limitations to the Article. There is more
work to be done to refine the concept of “identity” used throughout the
Article; more sociology and psychology research that could be consulted to
bolster the argument for societal norms against facial recognition; more
law to analyze depending on the precise purpose and use of the facial
recognition technology, including the reference database used; and more
complications to untangle in what the reasonable expectations of privacy
mean for judicial supervision of the use of the technology and for
suppression motions in the criminal context. There are fundamental
questions about the limitations of the Katz framework itself, including how
it would apply to the extent dragnet uses of facial recognition technology
become common-place, commercially or otherwise.157
In discussions about privacy and emerging technologies, the central
question is whether the Fourth Amendment will continue to protect
existing societal norms and democratic principles, or if the pace of
technological changes will eviscerate them. I hope that this Article adds to
the ongoing conversations about the implications of facial recognition
technology for our democracy and privacy, particularly if they are used in
a dragnet, suspicionless, real-time manner.
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general public use.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). This has left open the question of
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